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We present a non-cooperative model of a family’s time allocation between work and a home-
produced public good, and examine whether the income tax should apply to couples or 
individuals. While tax-induced labor supply distortions lead to overprovision of the public 
good, spouses’ failure to internalize the collective effect of their choices points towards 
underprovision. A large parameter range exists for which a move from individual to joint 
taxation improves the welfare of both spouses. The source of Pareto-improvement consists in 
moving the level of the public good closer to its first-best, while an adjustment of intra-family 
transfers compensates the secondary earner for the increased tax load. 
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 1. Introduction
Economists’ view of how couples should be taxed has traditionally rested on the assump-
tion that households are organized eﬃciently. In this standard approach, joint income
taxation is generally seen as detrimental to welfare compared to individual taxation. The
argument is simple and has great intuitive appeal: joint taxation takes the household as
the taxable unit and implies high marginal taxes to the secondary earner. Since secondary
earners, in particular married wives, exhibit comparatively high labor supply elasticities,
joint taxation induces stronger distortions of labor supply than individual taxation (Apps
and Rees, 1999a,b; Gottfried and Richter, 1999). Many economists therefore advocate
to replace joint taxation by individual taxation. In this paper, we challenge the results
emanating from the cooperation-based family taxation literature by showing that joint
taxation may Pareto-dominate individual taxation if family members cannot commit to
eﬃcient patterns of behavior.
Our key result is obtained under the assumption that family members neither have
an incentive to strike bargains involving binding commitments, nor are able to implicitly
enforce eﬃcient outcomes through repeated interaction. Instead we assume that decision-
making in the family can be formulated as a non-cooperative game. This may be justiﬁed
on three grounds. First, it is well understood that cooperative bargaining is distinguished
from non-cooperative behavior by the ability of players to make binding agreements.
The implementation and enforcement of cooperative agreements within marriage typically
requires couples to incur transaction costs (Pollak, 1985). Noncooperation, in contrast,
avoids these costs. Thus, if the transaction costs associated with a cooperative bargain are
suﬃciently high, it will be optimal for a couple to remain at a non-cooperative solution.
Second, much of the family taxation literature implicitly appeals to folk theorems of the
theory of repeated games to argue that eﬃcient household resource can be sustained
through repeated interactions. The argument ignores, however, that these results apply
if and only if individuals are inﬁnitely patient, i.e., in the limit as discount factors tend to
one. Although this limiting case provides a useful theoretical benchmark, the assumption
of excessive patience is not particularly plausible. If one allows more realistically for
heterogeneity of discount factors, then families would sort endogenously into cooperative
and non-cooperative resource allocation regimes (Del Boca and Flinn, 2009). Finally,
leaving the preceding theoretical arguments aside, empirical evidence to date has not
been able to resolve the question of whether family decision-making is generally eﬃcient.
But recognizing the prevalence of wasteful and destructive phenomena at the household
level, it seems rather obvious that many families fail to coordinate on eﬃcient courses of
1action.
There are a number of ways of relaxing the assumption that households are organized
eﬃciently. Our approach is to envisage a “seperate spheres” contribution equilibrium
(Lundberg and Pollak, 1993) in which socially prescribed gender roles assign the primary
responsibility for certain public goods to the wife and others to the husband. To keep
things simple, we focus on an allocation in which the wife provides a home-produced public
good, which one could think of as time spent with a child, and the husband specializes
in the generation of money income, a portion of which he may transfer to his wife. Of
course, these roles are reversed if the wife is the primary and the husband the secondary
earner. We show that, in this simple non-cooperative environment, joint taxation may
welfare-dominate individual taxation. More precisely, parameter ranges can be found
where (i) both spouses achieve maximum utility under joint taxation, but also where
(ii) both spouses experience a utility gain through a revenue neutral move from joint to
individual taxation. When we drop the assumption that one partner is fully specialized
in market work and allow both spouses to contribute to the production of the household
public good, the parameter range under which joint taxation is optimal even tends to
become larger.
The intuition for our results is as follows. Non-cooperative behavior implies that there
is no self-enforcing mechanism that induces the wife to internalize the impact of her choices
on the husband. As a consequence, the wife tends to supply an ineﬃciently high amount
of time to the labor market, implying an ineﬃciently low provision of the household public
good. This problem is mitigated to some extent by the unconditional transfer from the
husband to the wife. At the same time, income taxation distorts labor supply downwards.
Noting the negative externality of labor supply, the payroll tax works like a Pigouvian
tax. It may well be the case that high marginal taxes as generated by joint taxation are
necessary to correct the negative externality in full. Thus, the behavior-induced externality
can interact with the tax-induced distortion in such way as to make both spouses better
oﬀ under joint taxation than under individual taxation. After a revenue neutral move
from individual to joint taxation, the tax load of the husband generally falls, while the
wife faces a higher marginal tax rate. The increase of the marginal tax typically induces
a stronger labor supply response from the wife to a variation in the transfer from the
husband. Due to his higher net income and a lower implicit price of the home-produced
public good, the husband tends to increase his transfer. In equilibrium, the higher transfer
often compensates for the higher tax load of the wife. Moreover, the undersupply of the
household public good is reduced. Therefore, both individuals may enjoy higher utility
2under joint taxation, while the budget of the government remains balanced. For some
extreme cases, there is already oversupply of the public good under individual taxation due
to very high marginal tax rates. In that event, moving to joint taxation would deteriorate
welfare further. When both spouses contribute to the public good, the structure of home
production becomes an additional source of ineﬃciency. The advantage of joint taxation
for tackling that problem can be traced back to its property of not distorting relative
input prices, as already stressed by Piggott and Whalley (1996).
Our work is related to the theoretical literature on family taxation. The standard
argument to replace joint by individual taxation as stated at the outset remains true even
if the endogeneity of fertility is taken into account (Meier and Wrede, 2008). Optimal
taxation theory in the Ramsey tradition even calls for selective taxation where women are
taxed at lower rates than men (Apps and Rees, 2007) or that marginal taxation of one
individual decreases in the income of the spouse (Kleven et al., 2009). While we too are
interested in the choice of tax unit, our focus is on how to optimally tax non-cooperative
couples. Non-cooperation implies that there is an additional distortion—one that does
not appear in eﬃciency-based models of household behavior. We show that the typical
behavior-induced externality of the noncooperative framework generates a large range of
parameter values for which a move from individual taxation to joint taxation improves
the welfare of both spouses.
Our contribution is also related to the literature on non-cooperative family decision-
making. The seminal study in this area is by Konrad and Lommerud (1995) who develop a
non-cooperative model of a couple’s time allocation. Their key ﬁnding is that it is possible
to inﬂuence the intra-family equilibrium outcome by lump-sum redistribution from one
partner to the other, and that such redistribution might lead to a Pareto-improvement.
Another close antecedent is Chen and Woolley (2001) who consider a family model in
which two partners choose the amount of a household public good non-cooperatively.
They demonstrate that targeting of beneﬁts within families matters, but take the labor
supply decisions of family members as exogenous. The non-cooperative approach has
also been adopted by Anderberg (2007) who analyzes the mix of government spending
when family behavior is ineﬃcient. Rasul (2006) and Rainer (2007) study non-cooperative
investments in public goods like child quality where the divorce law is the policy variable.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section lays out our
basic model and Section 3 derives its equilibrium. Section 4 characterizes the eﬃcient
allocation of resources. Section 5 examines the optimal choice of tax unit. Section 6
elaborates an extension in which both spouses can contribute to the production of the
3household public good. Section 7 discusses some caveats to our approach and Section 8
concludes.
2. The basic model
Consider a representative household consisting of husband (m) and wife (f). Both family
members have a unit of time endowment, and can earn a gross wage in the labor market
equal to wi (i = m,f). Individual i’s preferences are represented by a strictly increasing
and strictly quasi-concave utility function deﬁned over a private good, ci, and a home-
produced public good, q. Since our objective is to provide a model that is tractable
and, at the same time, highlights why the couple may enjoy higher welfare under joint
taxation than under individual taxation, we consider a logarithmic utility representation
of preferences:
U
m(cm,q) = lncm + βm lnq, (1)
U
f(cf,q) = lncf + βf lnq, (2)
where βf > 0 and βm > 0 are constant preference parameters. Although the speciﬁcation
is somewhat restrictive in implying homotheticity of preferences, it already allows for
a rich structure of outcomes, in particular the Pareto dominance of joint taxation over
individual taxation and vice versa. For simplicity, only the wife contributes to the public
good, which is described as home production. The wife’s total time endowment can be
spent on working (ℓ) or used for home production (q),
q = 1 − ℓ. (3)
The husband spends his time endowment working in the labor market, where he receives
the gross wage wm. The only way in which the husband can aﬀect the time allocation
decision of the wife is through a monetary transfer θ ≥ 0.
The consumption levels of the husband and the wife depend on the tax treatment of
couples and are respectively given by
cf = wfℓ[1 − ατf − (1 − α)τj] + θ, (4)
cm = wm [1 − ατm − (1 − α)τj] − θ. (5)
Under joint taxation (α = 0) the marginal tax rate τj is the same for both spouses.
Individual taxation (α = 1) by contrast has the individual as the tax unit, where wage
income is taxed separately at exogenous marginal rates τm and τf. Throughout the paper
4we assume that τm > τf. This assumption mirrors a progressive income tax schedule,
where the wage of the wife falls short of the wage of the husband.1 For convenience,
w
n
i = wi [1 − ατi − (1 − α)τj] (6)
denotes the net wage of individual i = m,f.
The sequence of events is as follows. First, the government commits to either joint
or individual taxation by announcing α ∈ {0,1}. Second, the husband chooses θ to
maximize Um(wn
m − θ,q) subject to the wife’s reaction function q(θ) = 1 − ℓ(θ). Finally,
the wife chooses her labor supply ℓ to maximize Uf(wn
fℓ + θ,1 − ℓ), which at the same
time determines the level of the home-produced public good q. Thus, in equilibrium we
have θ∗ (α,τj) and ℓ∗ (α,τj,θ∗(α,τj)). The joint marginal tax rate τj is determined by




∗(1,τj)) = τj [wm + wfℓ
∗ (0,τj,θ
∗ (0,τj))]. (7)
Solving this noncooperative game of complete information between the husband and
the wife, the next subsection deals with the choices of the two family members in reverse
order. We focus on the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this game and refer to this
just as the equilibrium in what follows.
3. Family resource allocation game
Given the transfer θ > 0 made by the husband, the wife has to decide how to allocate her










+ βf ln(1 − ℓ)
￿
(8)
Lemma 1 summarizes the results on labor supply of the wife:









The interior solution emerges for θ < ˆ θ ≡ wn
f/βf. In that case, the reaction of the wife to








1Should the wage of the wife exceed the wage of the husband, it would be natural to assign the role
of the primary earner to her, where the husband would be the only or main producer of the household
public good. In that event, the labels ‘husband’ and ‘wife’ have to be exchanged throughout.
5where, at given transfer θ, a higher marginal tax rate reduces ˜ ℓ and increases
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
∂˜ ℓ
∂θ
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Without a transfer from her husband, labor supply of the wife is independent of any
tax rate and of the wage. This is a consequence of the logarithmic utility representation
of preferences, where income and substitution eﬀects oﬀset each other. A higher transfer
reduces labor supply of the wife, as it enables her to consume more goods and at the
same time spend more time on home production. The reaction of labor supply to a higher
transfer is independent of the level of the transfer as long as labor supply is positive.
Furthermore, a higher marginal tax rate reduces the net wage of the wife and hence the
opportunity cost of home production. This in turn decreases labor supply and strengthens
the negative reaction of labor supply to an increase in exogenous income through a higher
transfer.






can be interpreted as the price the husband faces for an additional unit of home production
time of the wife. In what follows, we will refer to ρ as the perceived price of the household
public good. Comparing ρ to the actual resource cost wf reveals that the perceived price
is driven down by taxation of the wage of the wife and up by (1 + βf)/βf. The latter is
due to the fact that the wife will use the transfer partially for own consumption.












The optimal transfer is characterized in Lemma 2.







and ˆ θ ≡ wn
f/βf. In case of the interior solution, θ∗ = ˜ θ, the transfer increases with a
higher preference parameter for the public good of the husband, βm, is independent of the
preference parameter for the public good of the wife, βf, rises with the net wage of the
husband and falls with the net wage of the wife.
Proof. See the Appendix.
6A positive transfer requires that the husband’s net wage multiplied by the preference
parameter βm exceeds the wife’s net wage. Otherwise the preferred transfer will be zero.
An upper bound of the transfer is reached when labor supply of the wife touches zero, as
further increases reduce the consumption possibilities of the husband without increasing
the provision of the public good. The speciﬁcation of the utility functions leads to irrel-
evance of the wife’s preference parameter for the chosen transfer of the husband, as two
eﬀects cancel each other out: while the higher level of time used in the production of the
household public good tends to depress the transfer, the stronger reaction of labor supply
to a higher transfer works in the opposite direction.
The equilibrium of the resource allocation game has three possible regimes: the interior
solution, the no-transfer equilibrium, and the no-participation equilibrium. In order to








(1 + βm + βf)wn
f
βmβf[1 − ατm − (1 − α)τj]
. (15)
Here wm is that value of wm for which ˜ θ = 0, while wm solves ˜ θ = ˆ θ. Now, for wm ∈
(wm,wm), neither family member is bound by non-negativity constraints and an interior
equilibrium with θ∗ = ˜ θ and ℓ∗ = ˜ ℓ(˜ θ) turns out. For wm 6 wm, the husband’s non-
negativity constraint binds and a “no-transfer” equilibrium with θ∗ = 0 and ℓ∗ = ˜ ℓ(0)
emerges. If wm > wm, the wife’s non-negativity constraint binds and a “no-participation”
equilibrium with θ∗ = ˆ θ and ℓ∗ = 0 is the outcome.
From the above deﬁnitions it is also readily checked that an interior equilibrium exists
under both joint taxation (α = 0) and individual taxation (α = 1) if and only if wm(0) >
wm(1), which yields the following condition on τm:
τm < 1 −
βf(1 − τf)
1 + βm + βf
≡ τint. (16)
4. First-best public good provision
In order to have a benchmark against which we can compare the equilibrium of the family
resource allocation game, we now consider the ﬁrst-best level of public good provision.
Throughout we assume that the government has a tax revenue requirement which is
equivalent to the equilibrium tax revenue under individual taxation.
7For any Pareto optimum, the eﬃcient level of public good provision is determined by






Here βici/q is individual i’s marginal rate of substitution between the public and the
private good, while wf represents the marginal rate of transformation between the public
and the private good. Letting ˜ t denote aggregate tax revenue under individual taxation,
the resource constraint reads
cm + cf + wfq = wm + wf − ˜ t. (18)
Together with the resource constraint (18), the Samuelson condition (17) determines
the ﬁrst-best level of the home-produced public good. In case of identical preference









where the level of the public good is independent of the distribution of private con-
sumption. Moreover, the ﬁrst-best level of the public good increases with the preference
parameter β and falls with a higher resource cost wf. If βf  = βm, the Samuelson condi-
tion and the resource constraint still jointly determine the set of eﬃcient allocations. But
relatively more consumption for the individual with a stronger taste for the public good
will be associated with a higher optimal provision level, and vice versa.
5. The optimal choice of tax unit
We now consider the question of when and why joint taxation can emerge as the optimal
tax scheme, focusing on the interior equilibrium in which neither family member is bound
by non-negativity constraints. To illustrate the set of possible outcomes in a clear and
simple fashion, we take the assumption βf = βm = 1. Thus, the private and the public
good have equal weight in the utility function of both family members.
To begin with, as we consider revenue neutral tax policy changes, the government has
to choose τj under joint taxation such that aggregate tax revenue remains at the equilib-
rium level under individual taxation. For the interior equilibrium, it is straightforward to
establish the following intermediate result.
Lemma 3. When βm = βf = 1 and the interior equilibrium prevails, the revenue-neutral






3(wm + wf)(1 − τf)
(20)
8Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that the marginal tax rate under joint taxation will exceed the tax rate of the
husband under individual taxation, ˜ τj > τm, if and only if wm > 3wf (1 − τf). In that
case, a high wage diﬀerential exists, implying that the share of the wife in total tax
payment of the household is low already under individual taxation, while the transfer
from husband to wife is high.
Next, we compare the ﬁrst-best and the private provision level of the household public
good under joint and individual taxation. Focusing on interior equilibria with θ∗ = ˜ θ and
ℓ∗ = ˜ ℓ(˜ θ), the private provision level of the public good is
















wm − ˜ t
2wf
. (22)
Comparing (21) and (22), we have the following result:
Proposition 1. When βm = βf = 1 and τm > τf, the equilibrium provision of the
household public good relative to the ﬁrst-best is as follows. Let
˜ τm(τf) =
8 + τf(3τf − 8)
4 − 3τf
and   =
(2 − 3τf)(1 − τf)
2(1 − τf) − (1 − τm)(4 − 3τf)
.
Then:
a. For τm > τf > 2/3, the household public good is overprovided under both individual
and joint taxation.
b. For τm > 2/3 > τf, the public good is overprovided under joint taxation but under-
provided under individual taxation.
c. For τm ∈ (˜ τm,2/3), two cases may arise: if wm >  wf, there is overprovision under
joint taxation but underprovision under individual taxation; if wm <  wf, there is
underprovision under both tax regimes.
d. For τm < ˜ τm, the public good is underprovided under both individual and joint tax-
ation.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Figure 1 illustrates this result. First, the possible parameter values giving rise to an
















Figure 1: Overprovision and underprovision regimes.
τint. Within that region, there are parameter ranges where, independently of how couples
are taxed, the equilibrium provision of the home-produced public good is ineﬃciently
low (region a). This case arises when the tax revenue requirement is moderate, so that
individual tax rates are in a normal range and the perceived price of the home-produced
public good is high. Next, there are parameter ranges where, irrespective of the tax
regime, the equilibrium level of the public good is ineﬃciently high (region b). This
scenario occurs when the government’s revenue requirement implies very high marginal
tax rates. Finally, with some intermediate marginal tax rates, the equilibrium public good
level is ineﬃciently high with joint taxation and ineﬃciently low with individual taxation
(region c).
Having described the eﬃciency properties of the household equilibrium, we now turn
our attention to the main issue of concern, namely the characterization of the optimal
tax scheme. To this end, we compare individual utilities under joint taxation (α = 0)
and individual taxation (α = 1). Using βf = βm = 1, it is easy to check that the interior
equilibrium utility level of family member i (i = f,m) under joint taxation is
˜ U
i
J = Γi + ln
￿








I = Γi + ln
￿































Figure 2: Optimal tax regime regions.
Comparing (23) with (24), we obtain the main result of the paper:
Proposition 2. Let βm = βf = 1 and τm > τf. Consider the interior equilibrium of
the resource allocation game with θ∗ = ˜ θ and ℓ∗ = ˜ ℓ(˜ θ). Then there exist two thresholds









a. For τm < τm, both family members enjoy maximum utility under joint taxation
(α = 0) with the revenue-neutral marginal tax rate ˜ τj.
b. For τm > τm, both family members enjoy maximum utility under individual taxation
(α = 1).
c. For τm ∈ (τm,τm), the optimal tax scheme depends on relative wages. Formally,




such that both family members enjoy maximum utility under joint taxation (respec-
tively, individual taxation) if wm < ξwf (respectively, if wm > ξwf).
Proof. See the Appendix.
This result contains the key message of the paper: joint taxation may Pareto-dominate
individual taxation if family members fail to coordinate on eﬃcient patterns of behavior.
Figure 2 illustrates. In region A, both family members enjoy maximum utility under
joint taxation. When the government’s revenue requirement is moderate such that τm
11and τf are not too large, the price the husband faces for buying additional units of
home production time from his wife exceeds the resource cost, ultimately resulting in
undersupply of the public good. This situation is alleviated by moving from individual
taxation to joint taxation. The perceived price of the household public good falls, and
pre-transfer income is redistributed from the wife to the husband. With the speciﬁcation
under consideration, a large fraction of redistributed income is used for being retransferred
to the wife. The additional transfer reinforces the already positive impact of the initial
transfer on the provision of the public good. Consequently, the provision of the public
good gets closer to the eﬃcient level, and through the transfer mechanism both partners
enjoy higher utility.
In region B, individual taxation is optimal. If individual taxes rates are high and
not too dispersed, the husband’s price for purchasing additional units of time from his
wife falls short of the resource cost, and the equilibrium level of the household public
good is ineﬃciently high. In this case, moving from joint taxation to individual taxation
increases the perceived price of the public good and reduces the husband’s means. This
results in lower transfers that at the same time become less eﬀective in increasing the
wife’s home-production time. Thus, the source of the utility gain for both spouses again
consists in moving the provision of the public good closer to the eﬃcient level.
Finally, there exists a small parameter range C where optimality in taxation depends
on relative wages. Note that region A always comprises the underprovison region a, and
region B always comprises the overprovision region b. Region C is a subset of region
c in which the equilibrium public good level is ineﬃciently high with joint taxation and
ineﬃciently low with individual taxation. In this case, if the husband’s gross wage is high
relative to his wife’s, then the underprovision problem under individual taxation is less
severe than the overprovision problem under joint taxation, and so both family members
enjoy maximum utility when they are taxed individually (region II). Conversely, if the
spouses have similar wage rates, then joint taxation is more eﬀective in alleviating the
overprovision problem than individual taxation is in eroding the underprovision problem,
and so both spouses are better oﬀ under joint taxation (region I).
It turns out that an optimal tax policy inducing ﬁrst-best public good provision looks
as if it establishes a Lindahl equilibrium. Under individual taxation, the ﬁrst-best is
achieved by setting τf = 2/3. In this case, the price of the public good for the wife,
wf/3, and its perceived price from the point of view of the husband, 2wf/3, add up to
the marginal cost of the good, wf. Furthermore, the demand for the public good by the
husband at his Lindahl price equals the demand for the public good of the wife at her
12price, which mirrors the unanimity condition of the Lindahl equilibrium. Under joint
taxation, the ﬁrst-best public good provision will be obtained whenever the endogenous
joint tax rate is at τj = 2/3, which yields the same individualized prices. Underprovision
of the public good turns out if the sum of the personal prices exceeds the gross wage of
the wife, and overprovision occurs if the sum of these two prices falls short of the marginal
resource cost of the public good.
Our discussion so far has focused on the eﬀects of shifting from individual to joint
taxation in the interior equilibrium of our model. However, the property of symmetry
of interests as regards to tax policy up to now cannot be generalized, as can be seen by
analyzing tax reforms in the “no-transfer” equilibrium:
Proposition 3. Let βm = βf = 1 and τm > τf. Consider the no-transfer equilibrium of
the resource allocation game with θ∗ = 0 and ℓ∗ = ˜ ℓ(0). Then the wife achieves maximum
utility under individual taxation (α = 1), while the husband’s utility is maximized under
joint taxation (α = 0).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 3 shows that a tax policy reform may have asymmetric eﬀects on intra-
household utility levels. If the equilibrium transfer from the husband to the wife is zero,
switching to individual taxation is beneﬁcial for the wife as her tax load goes down. At the
same time, the husband would suﬀer from the reduction of the home-produced public good
due to her increased labor supply. A similar argument applies to the ”no-participation”
equilibrium. Suppose that the wife’s equilibrium labor supply is zero and is achieved by
means of a positive transfer under individual taxation. Moving to joint taxation would
generally reduce the transfer from the husband to the wife as it becomes more eﬀective,
while the labor supply of the wife would remain at zero. In such a situation, the tax
reform would only redistribute income from the wife to the husband, and utilities would
again move in opposite directions.
6. Extensions
So far, we have assumed that the husband spends his entire time endowment working in
the labor market. This is of course a strong assumption: in practice, none of the partners
may be fully specialized in the generation of money income. Let us now specify a home
production technology in which each spouse may contribute time to the production of a




ρ + (1 − γ)(qm)
ρ￿1/ρ, (25)
13where qi = 1 − ℓi is the amount of time that spouse i contributes to the production of
the public good, γ is a relative productivity parameter and ρ determines the elasticity of
substitution between the wife’s and the husband’s labor in household production. Note
that our basic model corresponds to the case in which γ = 1. In what follows, we shall
restrict ourselves to the case of perfect substitutes (ρ = 1) and the case of unit elasticity
of substitution (ρ = 0). We continue to assume that the husband may make ﬁnancial
transfers to his wife.
6.1. The case of perfect substitutes (ρ = 1)
In this case, the household production function gives rise to isoquants that are straight
lines. As before, the wife chooses her time allocation to maximize her utility, taking the
time allocation of her husband and the transfer from him as given. Using βf = βm = 1,














The husband chooses his time allocation and monetary transfers to his wife so as to
maximize his utility, subject to the way in which she will respond to his choices. The






m(1 − qm) − θ







m(1 − qm) − θ
γqf + (1 − γ)qm
(28)
Clearly, only one of these can hold with equality if wn
m/(1 − γ)  = wn
f/γ. Indeed, if the
husband has a comparative advantage in market work, only (29) can hold with equality,
and if it does so, then there is full specialization in market work by the husband (˜ qm = 0),
and he eﬀectively buys home production time from his wife through a voluntary transfer
(˜ θ > 0). Thus, a separate spheres equilibrium, as assumed in the basic model, now arises
endogenously. In this equilibrium, the wife has the responsibility for the provision of the
household public good and the husband specializes in the generation of money income.
It follows immediately that, in the case of perfect substitutes, our main results on the
optimality of joint taxation for non-cooperative couples remain unchanged.
6.2. The case of unit elasticity of substitution (ρ = 0)




14Thus the time inputs of the husband and the wife are complements at the margin. The
























It is readily veriﬁed that the equilibrium transfer of the husband can be expressed as
θ∗ = max{0, ˜ θ} with
˜ θ =
γwn




His equilibrium time allocation is given by q∗
m = min{1 − β








In equilibrium, both partners spend time on the production of the household public good.
Where does this leave us in the welfare comparison between individual and joint taxa-
tion? We do not explicitly characterize the conditions under which joint taxation Pareto-
dominates individual taxation when both spouses contribute to household production.
But some thought reveals that joint taxation now has the additional advantage of not
distorting the time input structure in household production (Piggott and Whalley, 1996).
Individual taxation, by contrast, changes the opportunity cost of each partner’s time in
household activities asymmetrically and thus distorts the input decisions in household
production. The implication is that in the extended model a move from individual to
joint taxation can be welfare improving for a larger range of parameter ranges than in
the basic model. This is illustrated in Table 1, which reports the results from a simple
numerical example. The key message that one can extract from the table is that there ex-
ist individual tax rates under which individual taxation welfare-dominates joint taxation
in the basic model, but joint taxation is the Pareto-optimal tax scheme in the extended
model. Overall, therefore, allowing both couples to contribute to home production only
reinforces our Pigouvian argument in favor of joint taxation.
15Table 1: Results of a Numerical Example
Does Joint Taxation Pareto-Dominate
Individual Taxation?
Basic Model Extended Model
(γb = 1) (0 < γe < 1)
Case 1: γb = 1, γe = .5
(τf = .1, τm = .3) Yes Yes
(τf = .4, τm = .6) Yes Yes
(τf = .6, τm = .8) No Yes
(τf = .7, τm = .9) No Yes
Case 2: γb = 1, γe = .75
(τf = .1, τm = .3) Yes Yes
(τf = .4, τm = .6) Yes Yes
(τf = .6, τm = .8) No Yes
(τf = .7, τm = .9) No Yes
Case 3: γb = 1, γe = .95
(τf = .1, τm = .3) Yes Yes
(τf = .4, τm = .6) Yes Yes
(τf = .6, τm = .8) No Yes
(τf = .7, τm = .9) No No
Notes: The numerical example assumes that wm = 1, wf = 0.8, βm = 1,
βf = 1.
7. Discussion
It is important to air some caveats to the perspective developed so far. The perhaps
most controversial feature of our model is that the equilibrium is Pareto-inferior to a
cooperative solution, and yet we do not discuss the dynamics of household formation and
dissolution. Should we expect individuals to have an incentive to enter marriage, knowing
fully well that strategic behavior will prevent them from reaching eﬃcient outcomes?
In a recent paper, Barham et al. (2009) highlight the importance of strategic family
interactions in determining marriage formation and dissolution. In their model, economies
of scale associated with living as a couple rather than as a single provide incentives for
marriage, while free riding in the provision of household public goods leads to negative
externalities. In equilibrium, stable marriages form when couples are suﬃciently similar.
But it may be also rational for couples to form strategic marriages anticipating that the
16partnership will subsequently dissolve. Thus, non-cooperative behavior does not eliminate
marriage as an equilibrium phenomenon. However, holding everything else constant,
free riding in the provision of public goods implies that strategic marriages are more
likely to end in divorce than cooperative marriages. For our purposes, it it suﬃcient
that (i) positive externalities in household production exist, (ii) primary earners make
unconditional transfers to secondary earners, and (iii) labor supply decisions are not
coordinated - which may hold for many couples who behave cooperatively in many other
respects.
Another issue our model does not deal with is preference heterogeneity among spouses.
However, our results are not special to the case of symmetric preferences. What drives
our argument is the recognition that labor supply decisions may constitute an ineﬃcient
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. Family members are induced to work too much and to
provide too little of home-produced public goods because of a collective action problem at
the household level. Therefore, spousal welfare is no longer always a monotonic increasing
function of the wife’s wage, making the policy issues faced by society very diﬀerent from
those taken into account in traditional models of family taxation. It implies, in particular,
that both spouses may achieve maximum utility under joint taxation, even if it implies
a higher tax load for the secondary earner. Overall, our key insight that tax design will
have to take account of not just the usual trade-oﬀ between equity and distortions caused
by taxes, but will also have to try to correct the ineﬃciencies created by non-cooperative
decision-making will continue to hold when one allows for preference heterogeneity among
spouses.
Finally, we assume that a family public good is provided through time inputs into
a simple household production process. In many cases, substitutes for home-produced
public goods can be purchased in the market. While using this option does not make
sense in a homogenous household framework with constant returns due to zero taxation
of home production, secondary earners with a high wage rate may ﬁnd it worthwhile to
supply more labor and buy additional units of these substitutes in the market. Such
a behavior would also be plausible with increasing returns in the production of those
substitutes. Although underprovision problems continue to exist in such frameworks if
the spouses do not coordinate the purchase of these substitutes, the eﬃciency argument
in favor of joint taxation becomes somewhat weaker.
178. Conclusions
This paper integrates two diﬀerent strands of research on household behavior, on strategic
family decision-making and on family taxation. Our analysis gives a sense of why family
taxation issues may go beyond conventional labor supply elasticity considerations. The
reason is that, with non-cooperative couples, an additional distortion, not mentioned in
the previous literature, needs to be taken care of: the failure of spouses to internalize the
collective eﬀect of their actions. While conventional tax-induced labor supply distortions
lead to excessive incentives for home production, the collective action problem points
towards an underprovision of the household public good. Both distortions need to be
taken into account in choosing whether to tax individuals or households.
Our results show that if individual tax rates are not excessively high, then the equi-
librium provision of the home-produced public good is ineﬃciently low. In this case, the
collective action problem becomes the dominant consideration in the optimal choice of
tax unit, and a switch from individual to joint taxation generates a utility gain for both
spouses. The source of Pareto-improvement consists in moving the provision of the house-
hold public good closer to the eﬃcient level, while an increase in voluntary intra-family
transfers compensates the secondary earner for the increased tax load.
We also demonstrate that the existence of a collective action problem at the family
level in itself is not suﬃcient to guarantee the superiority of joint over individual taxation.
If individual tax rates are suﬃciently high and not too dispersed, then the household equi-
librium suﬀers from an oversupply of the home-produced public good. In such a scenario,
moving from individual to joint taxation reinforces incentives for home production, push-
ing the allocation further away from the Pareto frontier. This results in a utility loss for
both partners, and provides an additional eﬃciency argument in favor of individual-based
taxes.
A number of avenues for future research suggest themselves. A particularly interesting
issue is to focus on the dynamics of marriage relationships. When spouses interact repeat-
edly it is possible to design relational or self-enforcing contracts so that any short-term
incentive to behave non-cooperatively is oﬀset by a long-term beneﬁt from adhering to
eﬃcient patterns of behavior (Thomas and Worrall, 2010). It would interesting to study
how alternative tax regimes aﬀect the properties of such relational contracts. Future
theoretical research in the area of family taxation might also explore other dynamic as-
pects of household behavior, such as the eﬀects of diﬀerent tax regimes on human capital
investments or on marriage formation and dissolution.
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Solving this condition for ℓ yields (9). As with very high transfer levels labor supply
would be negative, eﬀective labor supply is given by ℓ∗ = max{0, ˜ ℓ}, where ℓ∗ = ˜ ℓ > 0 if
and only if θ < ˆ θ. The comparative static results are immediate from (9).
Proof of Lemma 2. The ﬁrst-order condition for an interior solution for the optimum













Inserting ˜ ℓ(θ) from (9) and solving for θ yields (13). However, ˜ θ < 0 is not feasible and
will be replaced by θ∗ = 0. Further, ˜ θ > ˆ θ leads to negative labor supply of the wife, which
is not admissible. As ∂Um/∂θ < 0 if ℓ = 0, θ∗ = ˆ θ holds in such a situation. Comparative
static results directly follow from (13).
Proof of Lemma 3. To prove the lemma, we plug (13) into (9), set α = 0 and βm = βf = 1,
and obtain:

















It is now straightforward to establish the lemma by substituting (36) and (37) into (7)
and then solving for τj.
Proof of Proposition 1. The government’s tax revenue under individual taxation is given
by:
˜ t = τmwm + τfwfℓ
∗ (1,τj,θ
∗(1,τj)) (38)
Plugging (37) into (38), and the resulting expression into (22), the ﬁrst-best provision
































Comparing (39) and (40), it follows immediately that
˜ qI T q




From (39) and (41), we obtain
˜ qJ T q
e ⇐⇒ wm T  wf where   =
(2 − 3τf)(1 − τf)
2(1 − τf) − (1 − τm)(4 − 3τf)
. (43)
Now, an interior equilibrium exists under both individual (α = 1) and joint taxation
(α = 0) as long as wm ∈ (wm(0),wm(1)), where wm(0) = (1 − τf)wf
1 − τm
and wm(1) = 3wf.
If τm > 2/3, then   < 1 − τf
1 − τm
, and hence ˜ qJ > qe for all (wm,wf)-pairs that give rise to
an interior equilibrium. If τm < 8 + τf(3τf − 8)
4 − 3τf
≡ ˜ τm, then   > 3, and hence ˜ qJ < qe
for all (wm,wf)-pairs that give rise to an interior equilibrium. Finally, if τm ∈ (˜ τm,2/3),
then   ∈ (
1−τf
1−τm,3), and hence ˜ qJ > qe (respectively, ˜ qJ > qe) if wm >  wf (respectively,
if wm <  wf). This proves the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2. From (23) and (24), it follows immediately that
˜ U
i
J > ˜ U
i
I ⇐⇒ τj < 1 −
[wm(1 − τf) + wf(1 − τm)]2
(1 − τf)(wm + wf)2 (44)
Inserting the revenue-neutral joint tax rate [see equation (20)] into the left-hand side of
the above inequality and solving for wm, we obtain
˜ U
i
J > ˜ U
i




Now, an interior equilibrium exists under both individual (α = 1) and joint taxation
(α = 0) as long as wm ∈ (wm(0),wm(1)), where wm(0) =
(1−τf)wf
1−τm and wm(1) = 3wf.
Clearly, if τm < 8
9 −
τf
3 ≡ τm, then ξ > 3, and ˜ Ui
J > ˜ Ui
I for all (wm,wf)-pairs that give
rise to an interior equilibrium. This establishes the ﬁrst part of the proposition. Next,
if τm >
5τf−4
6τf−5 ≡ τm, then ξ <
1−τf
1−τm, and ˜ Ui
J < ˜ Ui
I for all (wm,wf)-pairs that give rise
to an interior equilibrium. This establishes the second part of the proposition. Finally,
if τm ∈ (τm,τm), then ξ ∈ (
1−τf
1−τm,3), and ˜ Ui
J > ˜ Ui
I (respectively, ˜ Ui
J < ˜ Ui
I) if wm < ξwf
(respectively, if wm > ξwf). This establishes the ﬁnal part of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3. In case of a no-transfer equilibrium with θ∗ = 0 and ℓ∗ = ˜ ℓ(0),































Note that a no-transfer equilibrium exists under both individual and joint taxation as long
as wm < wf. It is now readily checked that
3τm−2τf
τm > 1 and
−τf
3τf−4τm > 1 for all τm > τf.
Thus, the husband (respectively, the wife) achieves maximum utility under joint taxation
(respectively, individual taxation) for all parameter values that give rise to a no-transfer
equilibrium.
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